When platforms compete for consumers, two types of consumer heterogeneity will matter: consumers value the presence of other consumers on a platform differently, and consumers contribute to the value of the platform differently. The optimal discriminatory pricing policy for platforms will depend on whether those two dimensions of consumer heterogeneity are positively or negatively correlated, which is an empirical question. In a companion paper (Cantillon & Yin, 2008) , we study membership decisions of trading firms for two competing exchanges: LIFFE and DTB. Our analysis shows that different traders care about liquidity differently. In this paper, we estimate the heterogeneous contribution to liquidity by different types. We combine the estimates from both papers of heterogeneous preferences and contributions to liquidity.
Individual heterogeneity in terms of value and contribution to network effects has a potentially great impact on firms' optimal strategies in terms of pricing and customer targeting.
Individuals may value network size differently but may also contribute to network effects differently, and those who value the network size most may not be those who contribute to the network the most. The optimal discriminatory pricing policy for platforms will depend on whether those two dimensions of consumer heterogeneity are positively or negatively correlated, which is an empirical question. If heavy contributors are correlated with those who derive utility from a larger network, then a smaller network will need to subsidize those heavy contributors to induce them to adopt its platform. That same firm should de-emphasize subsidies for heavy contributors who may have a preference for somewhat illiquid markets, and even more so for weak contributors. both. In this paper, we estimate the heterogeneous contribution to liquidity by different types on LIFFE and DTB. These estimates take into account the relative mix of heterogeneous traders on the liquidity of an exchange. We then combine the estimates from both papers of heterogeneous preferences and heterogeneous contributions to liquidity. Only by combining estimates of the contribution of traders to liquidity and their heterogeneous valuation of liquidity can we derive optimal pricing policies by exchanges. We find that valuations of liquidity tend to be correlated with contributions to liquidity in this setting, which suggests that subsidies are necessary to induce high liquidity contributors to trade on a less liquid exchange.
Given its emphasis on user heterogeneity and pricing, the two-sided (or more appropri- of trades generates value as opposed to specific social interactions between individuals. In this sense, our findings are divorced from the social network structure underlying economic interactions, and thus our findings should be considered as more appropriately generalizable to many agent, market level settings where social networks may be less prominent drivers of activity as opposed to within-firm settings. Moreover, our work puts together value of and contributions to liquidity.
By design, financial markets are institutions created to foster exchange among people with different needs. Thus, the financial literature has long recognized the heterogeneity of traders and the implications for liquidity. Research has focused on several different dimensions of heterogeneity, attempting to model the interactions between different types of traders and the resulting effect on contributions to liquidity. Black (1986) and the resulting trading behavior. They find that depending on the volatility in the market, informed and noise traders may switch positions from being liquidity providers to liquidity takers. As a result of these findings, we include controls for the volatility of the instrument being traded. (Reiss & Werner, 2004) We will ultimately try to construct types based on observable characteristics of our traders that reflect the various dimensions studied in this literature. We believe that we are the first paper to empirically match trader preferences for liquidity with trader contributions to liquidity.
Section 2 presents our model of liquidity production. Section 3 describes our data and presents descriptive statistics. Section 4 presents the empirical model, and Section 5 results from our estimation of volume production by different trader types. Section 6 and combines the results from Cantillon & Yin (2008) with these estimates to examine how heterogeneous valuations to liquidity are correlated with heterogeneous contributions to liquidity. Section 7 concludes.
Model
The model will essentially build on Jullien (2001 and 2006) .
We model liquidity as follows:
where liquidity et is a measure of liquidity of exchange e in time t, n 1et , n 2et , ... records the number of traders of type 1, type 2, etc. that are members of exchange e in month t, and Z et is a vector of various other variables that attract liquidity.
Equation (1) can be seen as a production function, and we will draw on the production function literature as we examine different specifications for the f(.) function in Equation (1) 
Cobb-Douglas Production Function (CD)
In this paper, we employ the Cobb-Douglas production function. The canonical CD production function (Cobb & Douglas, 1928) can be written as follows:
The CD is an attractive functional form since it allows for heterogeneity in how different types of traders contribute to liquidity and flexibility in terms of how different types of traders complement or substitute one another in producing liquidity. Since traders find their counterpart to a transaction amongst all the other traders (including those of its own type), the CD functional form appropriately allows the marginal effect of an additional type to be a function of the number of all other types trading. If we ignore the restriction that 0 < α k for all k, then there is no restriction on the sign of the first and second derivatives.
This means that the model permits trader types to be complements or substitutes for each other, since the cross-partial effect of an extra trader can be positive or negative. Otherwise, the model imposes both increasing marginal contributions to all additional trader types and complementarity between all trader types.
Note that the marginal effect of each trader is a function of the number of other types.
For example:
As a result, the marginal effect of a type of trader will change in magnitude over time as the mix of other traders changes. The interaction effect of one type of trader with another type will also vary in magnitude with the mix of other traders. However, the Cobb-Douglas functional form imposes that the signs on these derivatives will remain constant over time, as clear from the examples in Equations 4 and 5.
Data
Our data comes from the competition between LIFFE and DTB that played out during the 1990s. Both exchanges offered trading in the Bund future, a future on the German government bond, and they competed fiercely to attract members and trading volumes. For the purposes of this paper, we focus on the period between November 1990 and April 1998. We use the collected information on group ownership and mergers and acquisitions to match establishments to groups (procedure described in Cantillon & Yin, 2008) . With this convention, our dataset covers 578 groups. On average, 362.64 groups are present in any given month (min = 315, max = 433, std deviation = 32.66).
Types will be defined on the basis of business lines only for now. Business lines proxy for trading motives and sources of revenue. 3 We partitioned the groups in our dataset into seven business lines: universal bank, investment bank, retail bank, specialized trading firm, asset management, brokerage, and proprietary trading firm. We distinguished banks by the type of customers they serve. Retail banks serve primarily individual customers as well as small and medium enterprises. Investment banks serve corporate clients as well as, often, wealthy individuals. Universal banks serve all types of customers.
For most of their activities, investment banks compete with more focused financial firms. Asset management firms sometimes offer brokerage services to a retail clientele and trade on their own account on top of their core asset management activity. Brokerages offer execution services and sometimes also offer some funds. Proprietary trading firms are firms that focus on trading on their own account. Table 1 compares the activities covered by these firms. In categorizing our firms, we have assigned the smallest encompassing category for each group.
Thus a group active in market making, proprietary trading and asset management would be classified as an IB, but a group active in asset management and proprietary trading would be classified as an asset management firm and a group active in proprietary trading and market making would be classified as a specialized trading firm. Evaluated at the time a group first appears in our dataset, our data contain 64 universal banks, 28 retail banks, 102 investment banks, 48 asset management firms, 95 specialized trading firms, 110 brokerages and 131 proprietary trading firms. 
Exchange data
For both exchanges, we collected the following monthly data: (1) We use the Deutsche Mark (DM) as the currency for all the data. Fees are converted into DM using the monthly average exchange rate for the Pound/DM. Maturities for the Bund are quarterly and generate three-month cycles in trading volumes. We will account for this cyclicality with expiry month fixed effects. for universal bank, retail bank, investment bank, specialist, broker, asset manager, and
Empirical model
proprietary. Let K denote the set of indices for the business types. Using volume V et on the exchange e per month t as our measure of liquidity, we then have
where ε et is an error term and Z et is a vector of regressors from Equation 1 that contains at minimum 1 to generate a constant term.
Taking logs, we get ln(V LIF F Et + V DT Bt ) = β 0 + β convergence convergence t + β volatility volatility t + β trend trendd t
+β trend2 trend where trend t is linear time trend by month 4 , december t is a dummy variable for every December expiry month, and expiry t is a dummy variable for every other expiry month excluding December. 5 The purpose of this first stage is twofold: (1) we estimate the effect on total volume, rather than volume on each exchange separately, of macro events and trends that drive Bund trading volume over our sample period, (2) we assign as much explanatory power as possible to these macro events and trends before estimating the marginal effects of the number of different types of bidders on volume of Bund trading on each exchange.
Note that in all models, identification of the coefficients on each of the types in these models comes strictly off of variation in the number of types across exchanges and over time related to the variation in volume over time.
Estimation
The Since we believe that the error terms for both of these exchanges would be correlated in each period, we use seemingly unrelated regression to simultaneously estimate the coefficients on types and other control variables for each exchange. Although we control as much as possible for drivers of volume trading associated with a time trend, expiry dates, and macro events, the finance literature suggests that trading in one period may be correlated with trading in the following period for reasons not captured by our regressors, so autocorrelation of our data is also a concern. We conduct various tests for serial correlation for each of our models. Only Model 1 exhibits a strong AR1 process, suggesting that the other controls in Models 2 & 3 do actually control for autocorrelation. Nevertheless, to correct for autocorrelation, we use feasible generalized least squares in combination with seemingly unrelated regression to correct for both serial and contemporaneous correlation in all cases.
As a result, standard errors in Model 2 and Model 3 may be inflated.
Consistent with the empirical productivity literature, we may face an endogeneity problem where the number of traders on an exchange is likely the result of expectations on the part of traders about how much volume will be on the exchange. Alternatively, membership may be correlated with unobservable quality of the exchange that also drives trading vol- trader membership. We also estimate the coefficients for DTB and LIFFE separately, allowing quality to interact with the regressors and generate different marginal effects for trader types on each exchange. Finally, in a subsequent draft of this paper, we will investigate the use instrumental variables to correct for endogeneity as a robustness check. Table 3 presents the ordinary least squares estimates for the first stage presented in Equation 8. We choose to fit the natural log of total volume, ln(V LIF F Et + V DT Bt ), rather than total volume directly since our second stage estimates will be using logged volume as dependent variables as well. The R-squared on this first stage indicates that already 94% of the variation in volume over our sample period can be explained by volatility in the underlying Table 4 presents the feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) combined with seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) estimates for Models 1, 2, and 3 as described in Section 4. The dependent variable in all cases is logged volume for DTB or LIFFE. Although reported, the use of SUR invalidates the typically calculated R-squared. Instead, graphical evidence of goodness of fit are presented. The estimates from Table 4 are transformed to generated predicted values for volume on DTB and LIFFE, and those are plotted alongside the observed volumes. In the interests of space, only the plots for LIFFE and DTB from Model 3 are presented; the fits are similarly close for Models 1 and 2 as well. It is hard to interpret the coefficients from Table 4 The signs on fees and margins are also significant and the correct sign except in the case of fees for LIFFE: we would expect volume of trading to decrease with higher transaction fees and higher margins. These results already suggest that different traders contribute to liquidity differently, and so exchanges should take into account the type of trader and mix of trader types when trying to assess which traders to target and subsidize (if any). In future versions of this paper, we would like to enrich the specification for unobservable member characteristics. The motivation for why different traders contribute to liquidity comes from our understanding of how trading behavior varies with trading motives (hedging, arbitrage, speculation, brokerage). In practice, our observable trader characteristics imperfectly proxy for this trading behavior. We will refine the empirical approach by adding a (logit) probability function of being one of these four types of traders (hedger, arbitrageur, speculator or broker) based on observable characteristics. The probability function will be jointly estimated with the production function (now based on these four types).
First stage estimates

Second stage estimates
Value vs. contribution to liquidity
As a second attempt to infer information about trading motives from observable infor- The Cobb-Douglas function already allows for complementary and substitutability among trader types. We will nevertheless consider its extension, the translog function, that allows for richer patterns of interactions.
With the empirical results at hand, we will be able to identify which aspects of the Jullien (2001, 2006) are most in need of extension to derive normative interpretations of our results Standard errors are presented below coefficient estimates in italics. *significant @ 5% Standard errors are presented below coefficient estimates in italics. *significant @ 5%, †significant at 10%
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